Operation Absolute Resolve: A Strategic, Legal, and Geopolitical Analysis of the Capture of Nicolás Maduro

Executive Summary

On January 3, 2026, the geopolitical architecture of the Western Hemisphere underwent a seismic shift with the execution of "Operation Absolute Resolve." This unilateral military operation, authorized by the President of the United States and executed by elite elements of the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), resulted in the forcible extraction of Nicolás Maduro Moros, the de facto President of Venezuela, and his wife, Cilia Flores, from the Miraflores Palace in Caracas.¹ This event marks the first time since the 1989 invasion of Panama that the United States has deployed military force to capture a sitting foreign leader on charges of narcotics trafficking, fundamentally reasserting the Monroe Doctrine in an era of renewed great power competition.³

The operation was not an isolated tactical event but the kinetic culmination of a decade-long strategy of "lawfare," diplomatic isolation, and economic strangulation. The legal predicate for the capture rests on a complex—and internationally contested—interplay of US domestic jurisprudence, specifically the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, and aggressive interpretations of counter-terrorism authorities regarding "narco-terrorist" organizations.⁴ While the United States views the operation as a necessary law enforcement action against a "criminal enterprise" masquerading as a state, the international community faces a profound challenge to the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and head-of-state immunity.⁶ Furthermore, the subsequent declaration that the US intends to "run" Venezuela during a transition and utilize its oil reserves for reimbursement raises critical questions under the Law of Occupation and International Humanitarian Law.⁶

This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the timeline leading to the capture, the specific legal grounds cited by the US government, the countervailing international legal frameworks, and the strategic implications for the region.

Part I: The Genesis of Conflict – From "Bolivarian Revolution" to "Criminal Enterprise" (2015–2020)

To understand the events of January 2026, one must analyze the systematic transformation of the US-Venezuela relationship. What began as an ideological rivalry under Hugo Chávez devolved into a criminal investigation under Nicolás Maduro. The US strategy hinged on reclassifying the Venezuelan state apparatus not as a sovereign political entity, but as a transnational criminal organization known as the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns).

1.1 The Structural Criminalization of the State

The term Cartel de los Soles refers to a shadowy network embedded within the Venezuelan armed forces (FANB) and the executive branch. The name is derived from the sun insignia worn on the epaulets of Venezuelan generals. US investigations, dating back to the mid-2010s, posited that this cartel was not merely corrupt elements within the state, but that the state itself had been repurposed to facilitate narcotics trafficking.⁷

According to the superseding indictment and long-standing intelligence assessments, the operational structure of this alleged conspiracy involved:

• The Air Bridge: Since approximately 1999, high-ranking officials allegedly facilitated the dispatch of cocaine from Venezuela to Honduras and Mexico, utilizing a "safe passage" corridor for aircraft departing from Venezuelan airbases.

• The FARC Connection: The investigation alleged a symbiotic relationship between the Venezuelan executive and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Venezuelan state provided sanctuary and weapons to the FARC in exchange for the safe transit of cocaine and shared revenue. This partnership was described by US prosecutors not just as corruption, but as "narco-terrorism"—using drug proceeds to fund an insurgency intended to destabilize the region and harm the United States.⁷

• The Diplomatic Shield: A critical component of the scheme involved the abuse of diplomatic privileges. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that during Maduro's tenure as Foreign Minister (2006–2013), he personally facilitated the sale of Venezuelan diplomatic passports to known traffickers. This allowed cartel members to travel internationally without scrutiny and to transport drug proceeds in diplomatic pouches or protected private aircraft.⁷

1.2 The 2020 Indictment: The Legal Rubicon

The pivot from political opposition to criminal prosecution was formalized on March 26, 2020, when the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment charging Nicolás Maduro and 14 other current and former officials with narco-terrorism, corruption, and drug trafficking.

Table 1: Key Defendants and Charges in the 2020 Indictment

Defendant	Role/Title	Key Allegations
Nicolás Maduro Moros	President of Venezuela	Leadership of the Cartel de los Soles; managing drug routes; negotiating with FARC leadership.7
Diosdado Cabello	President of Constituent Assembly	Co-conspirator in cartel leadership; coordination of logistical support for shipments.
Vladimir Padrino López	Minister of Defense	Allowing military aircraft to be used for trafficking; protecting airstrips.
Cilia Flores	First Lady	Trafficking seized cocaine; utilizing state-sponsored gangs (colectivos) for protection.7
Maikel Moreno	Chief Justice of Supreme Court	Money laundering; dismantling judicial oversight of the cartel.

This indictment was historically significant because it marked the moment the United States ceased to view Maduro primarily as a political actor. By placing a $15 million bounty on his head (later raised to $50 million), the US signaled that diplomatic normalization was effectively impossible without his removal.⁹ The charges were specific:

1. Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy: A charge carrying a mandatory minimum of 20 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

2. Cocaine Importation Conspiracy: Alleging the importation of 200–250 metric tons of cocaine annually into the US.⁷

3. Possession of Machine Guns: Specifically related to the militarized protection of drug loads, linking the head of state directly to violent enforcement mechanisms.⁷

   
   

Part II: The Road to "Absolute Resolve" – The Escalation Timeline (2024–2025)

The transition from indictment to kinetic action was driven by the failure of the electoral path and the return of a "Maximum Pressure" administration in Washington. The years 2024 and 2025 served as the crucible that hardened US resolve.

2.1 The Electoral Failure of 2024

In 2023, the Biden administration had attempted a diplomatic reset, lifting some oil sanctions in exchange for the promise of free elections (the Barbados Agreement). This strategy collapsed in July 2024.

• The Election: On July 28, 2024, Venezuela held presidential elections. The opposition, coalesced behind Edmundo González Urrutia (a proxy for the banned María Corina Machado), mobilized unprecedented voter turnout.

• The Fraud: The Maduro-controlled CNE announced a victory for Maduro with 51% of the vote but refused to release precinct-level data. The opposition, having collected tally sheets from polling stations, published evidence suggesting a landslide victory for González (approx. 67% to 30%).⁵

• The Fallout: The US, EU, and major Latin American nations refused to recognize the results. This confirmed the view within the US national security establishment that Maduro would never cede power through democratic means, necessitating a shift back to coercion.¹¹

2.2 2025: The Return of "Maximum Pressure"

With the inauguration of President Trump in January 2025, US policy shifted immediately from containment to active confrontation. The administration's logic was that the "gray zone" status quo—where Maduro remained in power despite sanctions—was intolerable.⁹

Timeline of Escalation (2025):

• January 2025: The US revokes Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 600,000 Venezuelans residing in the US. This move was dual-purpose: it signaled a hardline immigration stance and removed a safety valve for the Venezuelan diaspora, theoretically increasing pressure on the regime from abroad.⁹

• March 2025: The administration imposes a "secondary sanction" tariff of 25% on any nation purchasing Venezuelan crude oil. This was a direct shot at China and India, the primary buyers of Venezuelan oil, effectively severing Maduro's remaining financial lifelines.⁹

• September 2025: The Department of Defense commences a massive naval buildup in the Caribbean. The deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group and amphibious assault ships (including the USS Iwo Jima) was framed as a counter-narcotics operation. During this period, US forces conducted 35 strikes against "drug boats," killing 115 alleged traffickers, desensitizing the region to US military kinetic action.¹³

• October 2025: President Trump orders an end to all diplomatic negotiations. The White House declares that Washington is in an "armed conflict" with the drug cartels running Venezuela, a crucial rhetorical shift that laid the groundwork for invoking the Laws of War rather than mere law enforcement cooperation.¹³

• November 2025: The State Department officially designates the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Crucially, the administration explicitly identified Nicolás Maduro as the leader of this FTO. This legal maneuver allowed the US to target him under counter-terrorism authorities (AUMF derivatives) rather than just criminal indictments.¹⁴

• December 2025: Covert operations intensify. Reports emerge of CIA assets operating inside Venezuela to track leadership movements. Trump states publicly that war is "not ruled out," a threat largely dismissed by international observers as bluster until the final moment.¹⁵

  
  

Part III: Operation Absolute Resolve – Tactical Execution

On the night of January 2, 2026, President Trump gave the final authorization for the mission from Mar-a-Lago.¹ The operation, codenamed "Absolute Resolve," was characterized by its overwhelming use of air power to suppress defenses, followed by a surgical special operations raid.

3.1 Force Composition and Deployment

The operation was a joint endeavor involving the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and federal law enforcement.

• Air Superiority: More than 150 aircraft were launched from bases across the Western Hemisphere (likely Puerto Rico, Florida, and carrier groups). Assets included F-22 Raptors for air dominance, B-1 Lancers for heavy strikes, and F-35s for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).¹⁶

• The Raiding Force: The ground element consisted of the US Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force), supported by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers) for insertion and extraction. The involvement of the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) was also noted, underscoring the "law enforcement" legal cover of the operation.¹⁵

• Naval Support: The USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), an amphibious assault ship, served as the primary offshore staging platform and the initial holding facility for the captured targets.²

3.2 The Timeline of January 3, 2026

• 02:00 VET (Local Time): The operation commences with massive airstrikes targeting Venezuelan air defense systems (S-300 batteries) and command-and-control nodes at Fuerte Tiuna, the central military complex in Caracas. Satellite imagery later confirmed the destruction of key military buildings within the complex.¹⁵

• 02:15 VET: Under the cover of the airstrikes, low-flying helicopters from the 160th SOAR penetrated Caracas airspace. They utilized "nap-of-the-earth" flight profiles, entering at 100 feet above water to evade remaining radar.¹

• 02:30–03:30 VET: Delta Force operators breached the Miraflores Palace (and potentially a residence at Fuerte Tiuna). They encountered resistance from the Presidential Honor Guard. A firefight ensued, described by Trump later as "a force against a heavily fortified military fortress".²

• 03:45 VET: Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores were secured. General Dan Caine later reported that they "gave up" after the compound was breached.¹⁸

• 04:30 VET: The extraction force departed Caracas with the "high-value targets" (HVTs) secured aboard helicopters. They were flown directly to the USS Iwo Jima located in international waters.²

• Aftermath: From the Iwo Jima, the prisoners were transferred to an FBI aircraft and flown to Stewart Air National Guard Base in New York, bypassing Guantanamo Bay (though some reports suggested a brief stopover) to immediately place them within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York.²

3.3 The "Decapitation" Strategy

The operation was designed as a "decapitation strike." By removing the head of state and the "First Combatant" (Flores), the US aimed to induce an immediate collapse of the regime's cohesion. The satellite imagery of Fuerte Tiuna shows precision strikes intended to paralyze the military command's ability to coordinate a counter-attack or mobilize the "reserve" militias.¹⁸

Part IV: US Domestic Legal Justification – The "Ker-Frisbie" Shield

The United States government has constructed a legal defense for this operation that relies heavily on domestic precedent to shield the prosecution from dismissal, even if the capture itself violated international norms.

4.1 The Superseding Indictment and the "Criminal State" Theory

Upon Maduro's arrival in New York, Attorney General Pam Bondi announced a superseding indictment. This document expands on the 2020 charges, reinforcing the narrative that the Venezuelan government is not a sovereign entity but a criminal enterprise.

• Narco-Terrorism: The central charge connects drug trafficking with terrorism. By designating the Cartel de los Soles as an FTO, the US invokes the Patriot Act and other counter-terrorism statutes (Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339B) which have extraterritorial reach. The US argues that because the cartel's goal is to "flood" the US with cocaine to damage public health, the US has subject-matter jurisdiction over the conduct.⁷

• Continuity of Crime: The indictment alleges criminal activity continuing through 2025, effectively arguing that Maduro was a "career criminal" whose presidency was merely a cover for illicit activities. This characterization is crucial for defeating immunity claims in US courts.⁷

4.2 The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: "Male Captus, Bene Detentus"

The most significant legal barrier to prosecuting a kidnapped foreign leader is the method of their capture. Here, the US relies on the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, a line of Supreme Court jurisprudence that is uniquely permissible regarding state-sponsored abduction.

• Ker v. Illinois (1886): The Supreme Court held that a defendant (Ker) kidnapped from Peru by a Pinkerton agent could still be tried in Illinois. The court ruled that "due process of law" applies to the trial, not the method of bringing the defendant to the courthouse.⁴

• Frisbie v. Collins (1952): This reaffirmed Ker, stating that the power of a court to try a person is not impaired by the fact that he was brought within the court's jurisdiction by "forcible abduction".⁴

• United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992): This is the most relevant modern precedent. The US government authorized the abduction of a Mexican doctor implicated in the torture of a DEA agent. The Supreme Court ruled that even if the abduction violated the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty, it did not prohibit the trial unless the treaty explicitly stated that abduction leads to dismissal. Since most extradition treaties (including potentially any with Venezuela) do not contain such a clause, the US argues the trial can proceed.¹⁹

The "Toscanino" Exception:

There is one narrow exception derived from United States v. Toscanino (2nd Cir. 1974), which suggests a court could divest jurisdiction if the defendant was subjected to "cruel, inhuman, and outrageous treatment" (e.g., torture) during the capture that "shocks the conscience."

• Trump's Rhetoric as Legal Strategy: President Trump's comments that Maduro had a "nice flight" and "loved it" were likely not just sarcasm but a deliberate legal signal to counter a Toscanino claim. By emphasizing the professional, quick, and non-torturous nature of the extraction (despite the lethal force used against guards), the administration aims to ensure the court retains jurisdiction.²

4.3 The "Unwilling or Unable" Doctrine

To justify the violation of sovereignty (as opposed to the trial jurisdiction), the US invokes the "Unwilling or Unable" doctrine of self-defense.

• The Theory: Under international law (specifically US interpretations of Article 51 of the UN Charter), a state can use force against a non-state actor (e.g., terrorists) in a foreign country if the host country is "unwilling or unable" to suppress the threat.

• The Application: The US argues that the Cartel de los Soles is a non-state narco-terrorist actor. Since Maduro is the state, Venezuela is structurally "unwilling" to stop the threat. Therefore, the US claims the right to intervene directly to neutralize the threat preventing the "armed attack" of drug trafficking.²⁰

• The Expansion: This represents a radical expansion of the doctrine. Previously used for Al-Qaeda in Pakistan or ISIS in Syria, applying it to capture a Head of State collapses the distinction between the "host government" and the "terrorist group," effectively treating the sovereign government itself as a terrorist target.²²

  
  

Part V: International Legal Framework – The Conflict of Norms

While US domestic law provides a path for prosecution, the operation faces withering scrutiny under international law. The capture of a sitting President is widely viewed by legal scholars and foreign governments as a violation of the foundational rules of the international system.

5.1 Violation of Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

• Act of Aggression: Operation Absolute Resolve involved the bombing of a capital city and the seizure of its leader. Absent a UN Security Council resolution (which was not sought), this is prima facie an act of aggression.

• The "Self-Defense" Rebuttal: The US claim of self-defense (Article 51) is contested. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) generally requires an "armed attack" to trigger Article 51. Most international legal experts do not accept that drug trafficking, however voluminous, constitutes an "armed attack" justifying war. Professor Marc Weller of Chatham House notes that the "criminal enterprise" argument offers no legal justification for military force under international law.⁶

5.2 Head of State Immunity (Ratione Personae)

The most specific legal protection Maduro held was Head of State Immunity.

• The Principle: Under customary international law, a sitting Head of State enjoys absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states (immunity ratione personae). This immunity is total—it covers all acts, private or official, while in office.

• The ICJ Precedent: In the Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), the ICJ ruled that Belgium could not issue an arrest warrant for a sitting Congolese Foreign Minister, even for war crimes. The court held that immunity is essential for the conduct of international relations.²³

• The US Counter-Argument: The US strategy relies on the derecognition of Maduro in 2019/2025. The US argument is: "Nicolás Maduro is not the President of Venezuela; he is a usurper. Therefore, he has no immunity." However, this creates a dangerous precedent where a state can simply "derecognize" a foreign leader to justify kidnapping them. Critics argue that de facto control of the state, not foreign recognition, dictates immunity to prevent exactly this kind of "regime change via abduction".²⁴

5.3 The UN Drug Convention (1988)

The US has cited the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs as a basis for action. However, Article 2 of that very convention explicitly protects sovereignty:

"The Parties shall not undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction and functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic law."By conducting a military raid to enforce US law on Venezuelan soil, the US violated the very treaty it claims to uphold.26

Part VI: The Occupation and "Reimbursement" – A Legal Minefield

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the post-capture landscape is President Trump's declaration that the US will "run" Venezuela during a transition and use Venezuelan oil to "reimburse" the cost of the operation. This moves the crisis into the realm of the Law of Occupation and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

6.1 The Status of Occupying Power

By declaring effective control ("We are going to run the country") and dismantling the local executive, the US has likely become an Occupying Power under the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.²⁸

• Duties: As an occupier, the US is responsible for public order, hygiene, and food supply. It cannot simply extract resources; it must administer the territory for the benefit of the local population.

• The "Transition" Model: The administration's plan appears to model itself on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq (2003–2004). However, the legal basis for the CPA was eventually buttressed by UN Resolution 1483. The US currently lacks such a mandate for Venezuela, making its direct administration legally precarious.²⁹

6.2 The Seizure of Oil: Usufruct vs. Pillage

The proposal to use Venezuelan oil revenue to pay for the US military operation ("Operation Absolute Resolve") risks violating the prohibition against Pillage.

• The Usufruct Rule (Hague Art. 55): An occupier acts only as the "usufructuary" (trustee) of state property. It can use the proceeds of state resources (oil) to pay for the costs of the occupation (e.g., local police, repairing local roads). It generally cannot use them to pay for its own war effort or to enrich its own treasury.²⁸

• Prohibition of Pillage (Geneva IV, Art. 33): Pillage is the appropriation of property for private or personal use, or for the aggressor state's enrichment, not justified by military necessity. If the US sells Venezuelan oil and deposits the money into the US Treasury to "reimburse" the cost of the airstrikes, legal experts at Chatham House and elsewhere warn this would constitute a war crime.⁶

• The "Reimbursement" Trap: Trump's statement ("start making money for the country... reimburse") suggests a commercialization of the occupation that directly contravenes the fiduciary duty of an occupier. This could lead to massive future liability for US oil companies involved in the extraction, similar to litigations faced by companies operating in occupied territories elsewhere.³¹

Part VII: Geopolitical Fallout and Strategic Consequences

The capture of Maduro has fractured the global diplomatic landscape, creating a distinct split between US allies (who are cautious) and US adversaries (who are apoplectic).

7.1 The Fracture of the Americas

• Support: Right-leaning governments, such as Argentina under Javier Milei, celebrated the capture as the removal of a dictator and a victory for liberty.³²

• Condemnation: Left-leaning and centrist governments (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico) expressed deep alarm. For them, the violation of sovereignty is a terrifying precedent. If the US can kidnap Maduro for "drugs," could they intervene in Mexico for the same reason? The concept of Latin American solidarity has been shattered by the reassertion of the "Big Stick" policy.

• Migration Crisis: The immediate aftermath of the strikes has led to panic in Caracas. The US "shelter in place" warning ³³ has done little to quell fears of a civil war. A new wave of migration is expected, potentially destabilizing Colombia and Brazil further, despite US attempts to close the border.

  
  

7.3 The Internal Vacuum and the Opposition Dilemma

The most immediate danger is the power vacuum within Venezuela.

• The Military Question: The loyalty of the FANB is fractured. With Maduro and Padrino López (likely indicted/targeted) gone, the command structure is decapitated. The US expectation is a swift capitulation, but the risk of warlordism is high.

• Machado vs. Trump: A significant political rift has already emerged. María Corina Machado, the opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Laureate, declared "The Hour of Freedom has arrived" and called for Edmundo González to assume the presidency immediately. However, President Trump publicly dismissed Machado, stating she "doesn't have the respect" to lead and asserting that the US will "run" the country.¹⁰

• Implication: This suggests the US does not intend to hand power to the democratic opposition immediately. Instead, the US may be seeking a "pliant" transitional figure—potentially even forcing cooperation from the remnants of the Maduro regime (like VP Delcy Rodríguez) to ensure stability over democracy.³⁷ This creates a scenario where the US is occupying Venezuela against the wishes of the very opposition it claimed to be liberating.

  
  

Conclusion

The capture of Nicolás Maduro by US forces in "Operation Absolute Resolve" is a watershed moment in the history of international relations. It represents the ultimate triumph of US domestic "lawfare" over Westphalian sovereignty. By reframing a foreign state as a "criminal enterprise," the United States has asserted a new doctrine: that sovereign immunity is conditional, and that the US judiciary has global reach when narcotics are involved.

However, the operation has opened a Pandora's box of legal and strategic liabilities. The reliance on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine may protect the prosecution in New York, but it cannot shield the United States from the geopolitical cost of being viewed as a rogue actor by much of the Global South. Furthermore, the plan to administer Venezuela and monetize its oil reserves places the US in a perilous position regarding the Law of Occupation, risking the classification of the operation as a war of pillage rather than a war of liberation.

As the US military secures Caracas, the challenge shifts from the tactical success of the capture to the strategic quagmire of the occupation. The disconnect between the US administration's "viceroy" approach and the Venezuelan opposition's democratic aspirations suggests that the capture of Maduro is not the end of the Venezuelan crisis, but the beginning of a volatile and unpredictable new era.

Disclaimer: The views and analyses expressed on this blog are for informational and educational purposes only. This site serves as a self-guiding diary intended to facilitate my personal understanding of specific subjects and does not serve as an authoritative reference. Information is provided "as is" without any guarantees of completeness or accuracy. Please consult a local, professionally trained individual in the subject matter or you can conduct your own research for any formal inquiries or professional advice

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